One of the most vehement attacks on Order No. 11 was delivered by General Frank P. Blair in St. Louis. Blair was astonished that a commander could lay waste a large section of Missouri by means of devastation, rapine and murder simply because Ewing lacked the courage to follow Quantrill. “It is the subterfuge of an imbecile,” remarked Blair. Blair continued by pointing out that 20,000 citizens were being punished because Ewing lacked the power or ability to seek out the 400 or 500 outlaws and murderers. Ewing had instead found it necessary to punish helpless people and destroy one of the finest sections of Missouri.19
It is significant that the first Governor of Kansas, Charles Robinson, concurred that Order No. 11 cast much cruelty upon the people of Missouri. Robinson, a Kansan, was a strong defender of the conduct of Kansas troops but vigorously attacked the role played by the “Red-legs” in Missouri. Robinson’s criticism of fellow Kansans should not be taken lightly.20
One of Quantrill’s officers, William Gregg, said that Order No. 11, “issued by the monster of monsters, General Ewing,” caused the people of Jackson County to suffer great hardships, by being forced to leave their homes with no money or food.”21 It is reasonable to assume that when 20,000 people are forced to leave their homes with so little, considerable suffering will occur. The cruelty of the Jayhawkers did not go unnoticed by the Missouri government. Governor Hamilton Gamble, as reported in the Missouri Democrat of 30 September, authorized the arming of men in some of the western counties to protect them- selves from raiding parties. The real leader of opposition against Ewing was Missouri State Treasurer George Caleb Bingham. Governor Gamble or Jered Bingham to Kansas City to see what could be done following the Lawrence massacre. Bingham went to Ewing’s headquarters in Kansas City and demanded that Order No. 11 be rescinded. Upon Ewing’s refusal to retract the Order, Bingham is reported to have said, “If you persist in executing that order, I will make you infamous with pen and brush as far as I am able.”22
George Bingham made good his promise. His large painting entitled “Order Number Eleven” which shows Ewing astride his horse supervising his troops as they brutally expel Missourians from their homes presents an interpretation of Ewing’s actions which is today generally accepted. The painting depicts a “Kansas Jayhawker” who has just shot a young man and is about to shoot an older man disregarding the pleas of a young girl begging for the life of the elderly gentlemen. Colonel Jennison is pictured with a number of blankets on his horse; he plans apparently to re- turn to Kansas with this booty. In the background is a funeral-like procession of people leaving their homes; columns of smoke from their burning homes and fields rise around them. This painting, as Albert Castel has pointed out, “did more than anything else to create the popular conception of Order No. 11.”23
Richard C. Vaughan, in a letter to Edward Bates, Attorney General of the United States, 28 August 1863, wrote that hundreds of loyal Union men in Jackson and Cass counties were being insulted, robbed, and even murdered. The implementation policy, he said, has caused many good men to leave their homes and seek protection in the brush. Many, he added, joined the guerrillas to insure their own safety.
Even staunch supporters of Order No. 11 saw the severity of its enforcement. Lawrence newspaper editor John Speer wrote, “Neither Sherman in his march to the sea, nor Butler at New Orleans, exceeded it in severity, but it was a just severity, conscientiously administrated by a just man. It was the extreme of humanity com- pared with the fiendish slaughters concocted and carried out by the community which it punished.24
The reaction of the South to Order No. 11 was as could be expected. Order No. 11 was not only denounced but it led to demands that guerrilla activities be increased as reported in the Daily Dispatch of Richmond, Virginia on 1 September, 1863:
The savage and inhuman measures adopted by the Yankees to put down guerrilla warfare proves that this mode of defending a country other- wise unprotected is more annoying and more dreaded by them than any other. . . . Let the guerrilla system . . . be thoroughly carried out, and if the barbarous retaliate . . . let the guerrillas, without waiting for orders exact an eye for an eye and a life for a life.
The Lexington Union on 5 September, 1863, centered its attack both on the cruelty of the order and on the possibility that the number of counties to be depopulated would be increased. It was feared that Order No. 11 might be expanded to the next tier of counties and then the next. The Union, as did many Missourians, feared an in- crease in the control the military had over local and state governments.
Ewing cannot be excused for not knowing what was going on. The enforcement was taking place only a few miles from his headquarters in Kansas City. Ewing had ridden through the district with General Schofield on his way to speak at Independence, Missouri. Many of the dislocated people of the district were flocking to Kansas City to depart for new homes. The press, alone, with its criticism of the enforcement procedure should have made Ewing aware of what was taking place. Ewing, himself, had ordered his men to track and find the bush- whackers and to take no prisoners. Another example of the extreme measures Ewing took is evidenced by his request to General Schofield made 18 September, 1863. The steamer Marcella had been stopped by guerrillas, and three Union soldiers had been shot. Ewing reported, “I have guerrillas here, convicted and unconvicted. Shall I retaliate?” Schofield’s answer was that, in his opinion, it would be just, but unwise, as it was too easy for the guerrillas to find victims for revenge.
The Official Records indicated that Ewing did little to stop the plundering until General Orders, No. 16, issued 2 October, 1863. Four days later, Ewing wrote Colonel William Weer: “There is a good deal of feeling against me already amongst Missourians. Don’t let the troops take stock except from guerrillas.” He also told Weer to leave General E. B. Brown’s people alone and reminded Weer that the second tier of counties was now in his district.25
Perhaps Ewing should not take the blame alone. The dilemma in which he found himself placed was not of his making. The cruelty of any war and especially of a civil war is great. The duration of violence was longer on the Kansas-Missouri border than in any other section during the Civil War. The “total war” of the border had begun early and ended late, as many guerrillas continued their professions as bank and train robbers. The “no holds barred” attitude of the combatants, the lack of civil authority, the political struggles among leaders, both military and civil, all added to Ewing’s woes.

To judge the effectiveness of Order No. 11 a look at guerrilla activity after the order was issued is necessary. We find that it did curtail guerrilla activity in Ewing’s district, but it did not stop it. The guerrillas simply moved into central Missouri in 1864 following their return from wintering in the South. The order may have stopped any future raids into Kansas, but the borders were also better guarded and the people of Kansas better prepared after the raid on Lawrence in 1863, and this might have been the discouraging factor. The order did cause the guerrillas to move south a little earlier than usual. As to its effectiveness then we can only conclude that Order No. 11 cur- tailed guerrilla activity in western Missouri by moving it to central Missouri.
To justify Order No. l1 as necessary is a different matter. First, the people involved were citizens of the State of Missouri and the United States, not the Confederacy. Although regulations regarding martial law are not covered in our Constitution, there is no doubt that the citizens of Missouri lost a great many of their personal liberties. General Ewing undoubtedly believed the order was justified; even so, he could have enforced Order No. 11 with disciplined Iowa, Illinois, or Colorado troops rather than with the revenge-seeking Kansans. As indicated by this paper, the Order made many loyal Missourians turn to the guerrillas for protection and caused many others to leave the state. The drastic acts of cruelty could only have been committed by angry, revenge-seeking men on both sides.
The timing of the order was unfortunate and created much hardship. Most of these people were small farmers with crops in their fields, little money, no place to go, no means of transportation, and many of the men were away fighting for the Confederacy or for the Union. With winter approaching and the bushwhackers “Jayhawkers” and “Red-legs,” General Orders, No. 11 – is that it contributed little to the outcome of the war. Preparing to go south, Ewing could have waited for spring to demand depopulation. It is perhaps most obvious here that Ewing was influenced by the cries of the press. The press crying for action, the Kansans for revenge, and Lane for “blood and fire” apparently influenced him to take immediate action. The order cannot be justified when, with a little more time and a little less emotionalism, a more sympathetic and effective means might have been devised to separate and remove the disloyal people from these Missouri communities.

There were large numbers of Kansas troops in Ewing’s district in 1863. In fact, all the Kansas troops in Ewing’s district with the exception of one company were stationed in the four counties affected by Order No. 11; the great majority of Missouri troops in Ewing’s district were found in the counties not affected by Order No. 11. The order explicitly stated that the depopulation would be vigorously executed by officers commanding in the parts of the district affected by the orders. Thus, the argument that the enforcement was undertaken by Kansas troops is justified. In addition, the Kansas City Daily Journal of Commerce on 5 and 17 September reported other Kansas troops were sent into the district. The 19 Missouri companies in Ewing’s district could have been called upon to enforce the order, or Ewing could have asked for troops from Illinois, Colorado, or Iowa. But Ewing turned instead to Kansas troops to enforce his order. An answer to the question of why Ewing used Kansas troops might possibly solve the mystery of Lane’s satisfaction with Order No. 11. General Ewing set the stage for the brutal reprisals in his efforts to punish the guerrillas. In a report to Schofield, his commanding general, Ewing wrote, “No prisoners have been taken and none will be. All the houses in which Lawrence goods have been found have been destroyed, as well as all the houses of known guerrillas, wherever our troops have gone.” Thus Ewing, by ordering no prisoners taken and allowing the troops, most of whom were Kansans, to decide who was a guerrilla and what goods came from Lawrence, was giving a sense of legality to the revenge-seeking troopers.

Order No. 11 and its enforcement brought most of the press down on Ewing. According to the St. Louis Missouri Republican: “We do not know what reasons operated upon General Ewing to issue Order No. 11 … It is inhuman, unmanly, barbarous . . . It is a prelude as we take it, to a raid by Lane and Jennison, from Kansas, when everything that remains in those rich and populous counties is to be swept away and carried into Kansas.”9 The Lexington Union on 5 September wrote that a lieutenant returning from a scouting patrol in Jackson County said: “It would make a man’s heart melt though it were of stone to witness what I have seen.” He felt sorry for the “helpless women and children driven out by the cruel or- der.” The Union continued:

. . .we have seen these refugees passing through our streets, ill clad, often times barefooted, leaving their only shelter, and their only means of substance during the approaching winter-the crops now maturing-in numerous cases without money to buy food or pay rent going they know not whether. We have found ourselves asking: can it be possible, that this is the work of an officer wearing the uniform of our country?

On 22 September the New York Times in summing up the situation in Missouri reported:

. . .Missouri is today more dangerously disturbed if not more dangerously disloyal than Mississippi. More contempt for the army and the Government is daily poured forth there-more turbulence in talk and in action is indulged in-and human life is less safe than anywhere else within all the military lives of the United States.

Newspaper criticism of Ewing and Order No. 11 was not unanimous. The Journal of Commerce continuously backed both. It had supported Order No. 10 before the Lawrence raid and on 25 August, 1863, the day Order No. 11 was issued, it asked its readers to read the order as it was “unavoidable necessary.” On the following day, 26 August, 1863, the Journal of Commerce reported: “Our advice to every man who wishes to see peace ever restored to the border is to stand by General Ewing, and especially in the execution of Order, No. 11 . . .” On 4 September 1863, the Journal of Commerce attacked both the Lexington Union and the Missouri Republican which had found great fault in Order No. 11. Their criticism, the Commerce said, was due “to their ignorance of affairs on the Border,” and the Commerce writers pointed out that the St. Louis editors were complaining more than the Union people on the Border. Ewing and his order also gained support from the Union League of Kansas City and the Jackson County Union Association.10 Ewing was, therefore, criticized by many and praised by some. But his image would always be somewhat hazy-black to some, white to others. He would be judged then and later in regard to two questions: Did Order No. 11 stop guerrilla activity, and could the Order be justified as necessary in any sense of the word even if its purpose was accomplished?

Assuming Ewing’s objective was to stop the guerrillas by removing their families and friends, how well did the order accomplish its purpose?

Militarily, Ewing was backed by his commanding general. General Schofield drafted a similar order, also on 25 August, 1863, and wrote Ewing: “. . . I am pretty much convinced that the mode of carrying on the war on the border during the past two years has produced such a state of feeling that nothing short of total devastation of the districts which are made the haunts of guerrillas will be sufficient to put a stop to the evil . . .” Schofield understood that some loyal people would suffer. He sympathized, “The commanding general is aware that some innocent persons must suffer from these extreme measures, but such suffering is unavoidable, and will be made as light as possible.” On paper Schofield’s order was harsher than Ewing’s. Schofield’s order provided for the destruction of houses, barns, and personal property; Ewing’s included only hay and grain among those items to be destroyed. When Ewing’s order was enforced by Kansas troops, however, it evidenced all the harshness of Schofield’s and more. The important issue is that Schofield agreed that some type of order requiring the depopulation of the District of the Border was necessary.

The order was supported by Colonel Bazel F. Lazear, a member of Ewing’s force, in a letter to his wife, on 17 September. Although Ewing’s order was thought unjust and cruel by some, he thought it “one of the best orders that has been issued, and I think will have good effect.” He commented that the order would prove troublesome for only a few union people as most of them had already left the area.”11

The Journal of Commerce fully supported Order No. 11 when on 29 August, 1863, it editorialized that due to General Order No. 11 the families of the bushwhackers were leaving and that the bushwhackers themselves would soon follow. And on 1 September, 1863, the journal complimented the vigorous campaign carried on by Ewing’s troops and asked for the same energy to be applied in the future. Ewing’s order accomplished the military objectives, according to the Journal. Two months later on 7 November this same source observed that great changes had taken place on the border and that the farmers of southern Kansas now felt safe for the first time since the war began.

Major Wyllis C. Ransom, speaking at a farewell supper for the 10th Kansas stated that, “Upon our immediate Border, by the grace of God, with the assistance of General Ewing and General Orders No. 11 we have peace-peace which I trust may be permanent and lasting.”’12 Ransom believed, like many, that peace had come to the Border because of Order No. 11. Peace had come, in part, because of increased difficulty facing guerrilla operations. We must also take into consideration the fact that the guerrillas always went south in the winter, thus with or without the order they would have been relatively inactive at this time.

The effectiveness of the Order No. 11 can be seen in guerrilla leader William Gregg’s statement, “The country having been depopulated under General Ewing’s Order Number Eleven, the men were sorely tried for food, apples being the only edible thing found in Missouri after leaving Lafayette County, and the boys nearly starved. . .”13 Ewing’s hope that the guerrillas would not be able to live off the land is apparently confirmed by Gregg’s statement. Guerrilla scout John McCorkle reported that on re- turning to Missouri after the winter of 1864, the irregulars could not find food for man or horse in Cass County.14

There is little doubt that Order No. 11 was a severe blow to the guerrillas. It served, however, only to hinder their operations in the District of the Border. When they returned after the winter, they began their activities again in central rather than western Missouri. If Ewing’s intention was to stop the guerrillas from raiding Kansas and operating within his district, his order was effective.

President Abraham Lincoln could see the potential evils of such an order. He informed General Schofield:

. . with the matters of removing the inhabitants of certain counties en masse; and of removing certain individuals from time to time, who are supposed to be mischievous, I am not now interfering, but am leaving to your own discretion. . . But, in like manner, you will repress assumptions of unauthorized individuals to perform the same service; because under pretense of doing this, they become marauders and murderers themselves.15

President Lincoln perceived that the men performing such a service could be as destructive as the guerrillas; he believed the orders could be carried out by a military force. But the troops called upon to perform the service were the Kansans, who carried out their orders with hatred and a burning desire for revenge. Albert Castel wrote in 1963: “In fact, with the exception of the hysteria-motivated herding of Japanese-Americans into concentration camps during World War II, it stands as the harshest treatment ever imposed on United States citizens under the plea of military necessity in our nation’s history.16 Col. B. F. Lazear who supported Ewing’s action observed in a letter to his wife, 10 September, 1863, that: “It is heart sickening to see what I have seen since I have been back here. A desolated country of women and children, some of them almost naked. Some on foot and some in old wagons. Oh, God.”17 Many Missourians were not happy with the hardships placed on some of their population by Order No. 11. John McCorkle observed that the people were banished and robbed by the same order and that so much was stolen that they had little to move.

Continued in Part III

Were such an edict issued by the Czar of Russia, towards any part of Poland, it would stamp him with infamy before the civilized world. Such, we believe, will be the verdict of history in regard to this order. Lexington Weekly Union (Mo.), 5 September 1863.

AT approximately five o’clock the morning of 21 August 1863, guerrilla leader William Clarke Quantrill and 450 men attacked the sleeping town of Lawrence, Kansas. After gaining control of the town, the guerrillas began their grisly task of looting, murder, and arson. Quantrill had ordered his men to kill every man big enough to carry a gun, and his orders were obeyed. Within four hours the guerrillas had killed approximately 150 unarmed men and had left 80 widows and 250 orphans. Most of the stores and banks of Lawrence had been robbed; 185 buildings, including one-fourth of the town’s private residences, had been destroyed. This was guerrilla warfare at its ugliest.

Following the raid on Lawrence, Quantrill and his guerrillas fled to the supposed safety of the Missouri border counties. Here the guerrillas di vided into smaller groups and headed for hiding places hoping to make their detection unlikely. The raid on Lawrence placed great pressure on the commanding general of the district, General Thomas Ewing, Jr. Ewing found himself faced both with the problem of tracking down the bush whackers and protecting Kansas from future raids and with the far more serious and immediate problem of keeping vengeful Kansans out of Missouri.

Quantrill’s forces had crossed into Missouri near Morristown, Missouri; it was here that United States Senator (Kansas) James Lane and Thomas Ewing met the night of August 22, 1863 and drew up Order No. 11.

General Orders, No. 11 of 25 August 1863, has been considered one of the cruelest and most unusual orders issued by a general during the Civil War. This order banished from four Missouri counties most inhabitants regardless of their sympathies. The only exceptions were that people living within one mile of a military post could remain, and those persons who could establish their loyalty could move to any military post or into Kansas except for the counties on the eastern border of that state.1 The four counties – Jackson, Bates, Cass, and the upper section of Vernon – were located in western Missouri, a state that remained in the Union. In Bates County, which did not have a military post, the entire population had to leave. The homes of 20,000 people were looted and burned, and their crops were confiscated or destroyed. In the 15 days allowed before they would be forcibly removed, they had too little time, too little money, and too little transportation to save many of their belongings.

Many saw the order as an act of vengeance, to punish the guerrillas for the “Sack of Lawrence,” The Lexington Union of September 5, 1863 asked, “Is this order designed to avenge this atrocity? Does a just government take vengeance for crime upon the innocent and helpless?” On September 1, 1863 the Daily Dispatch of Richmond, Virginia stated, “Quantrill’s raid upon Lawrence, Kansas, seems to have provoked a war of extermination against the people of Northern Missouri.”

In reality Order No. 11 was not issued as a punitive measure for the sack of Lawrence. As the Kansas City, Missouri Journal of Commerce of September 3, 1863 stated: “The Lawrence massacre was its occasion, not its cause.” The evacuation policy was apparently already in Ewing’s mind. The Official Records provide evidence that Order No. 10, issued 18 August 1863, three days before the raid, was similar in policy to Order No. 11; according to Order No. 10 families of known Southern Sympathizers were to be removed. Ewing wrote Colonel C. W. Marsh on 3 August 1863 that he believed the only possible way to curtail guerrilla activity was to remove the guerrillas and their families. Ewing’s action was an expansion of Order No. 10 but much harsher.

This study seeks to answer two questions: Was Order No. 11 effective and was it necessary?

One explanation offered for the order suggests its purpose was to assure the people of Kansas that they would be protected against future raids. Another reason for the Order was to curtail any attempt by Kansas to launch a raid of vengeance on Missouri. There seemed to be no doubt in the minds of most Missourians that such a raid would be forthcoming. Missourians who read Jim Lane’s speech which appeared in Missouri newspapers had a right to be frightened. Lane threatened as reported in the Daily Missouri Democrat (St. Louis) of 1 September 1863:

I will tell you what I want to see. I want to see every foot of ground in Jackson, Cass, and Bates counties burned over everything laid waste. Then we shall have no further trouble. The bushwhackers cannot remain in the country, for they will have nobody to feed them nobody to harbor them nobody to provide them with transportation no place to sleep in, and will have thirty-five miles further to march before they reach Kansas.

Lane then offered the following resolution to the people of Leavenworth which was unanimously adopted: “Resolved. That so many of the loyal men of the border as can be spared from home protection, be requested to assemble at Paola on the 8th day of September, with such arms and ammunition as they can procure Lane also told General John M. Schofield that he was going to “lay waste to the border counties of Missouri and exterminate the disloyal people.”2

On 3 September the White Cloud Kansas Chief (Troy), as well as other Kansas papers, asked that all citizens of Kansas who wished to assist in clearing out the Missouri bush whackers meet at Paola on 8 September.

General Schofield informed General Henry W. Halleck that Lane would not be permitted to enter Missouri. The Daily Missouri Republican on 6 September declared: “If Jim Lane attempts it, as he has threatened to do, Federal bayonets will protect the integrity of our soil.” But Missourians were frightened. The Neve Anzeiger des Westens (St. Louis), as reported in the Lexington Daily Union (Missouri) on 5 September described the people of Missouri as filled with terror and predicted that if Kansans, led by Lane, invaded Missouri, the Missourians could expect murder, plunder, robbery, slaughter, and “burning butchery.” To add to the Missourians’ fears the notorious Col. Charles Jennison, the most vicious and feared of the Kansas Jayhawkers, was given authority to recruit men into Union service.

Many border cities, hoping to escape retaliation from the Kansans, collected money for Lawrence 3. The Daily Missouri Democrat on 27 August reported that in Platte County 50 men gave from one to 10 dollars each in hopes of escaping the anticipated raid. Weston, Missouri gave 200 dollars to Lawrence. The Kansas City Journal of Commerce, which strongly supported the order, told its readers on 26 August that the order might satisfy the people of Kansas and save Missouri from a raid by Kansans. Ewing believed, or perhaps simply hoped, that this order, if enforced, might satisfy the Kansans. He was not going to allow a mass march on Missouri by Kansans as indicated by his correspondence with Schofield, 26 August, and 27 August, 1863.

Historian Albert Castel has pointed to a fourth Ewing motive which was both personal and political. The massacre took place in Ewing’s home state and among his friends. Thus a great deal of the blame for the raid was placed on his shoulders by his political enemies.4 The White Cloud Chief on 27 August announced: “If for every curse that has been be- stowed upon Ewing in Kansas, since Friday last, were [sic] a dollar there would be sufficient to rebuild Lawrence more substantially than ever, and to make every man in the state rich.” Kansas Governor Thomas Carney informed Schofield that many influential citizens of Kansas were against Ewing.5 General Frank Preston Blair, a Missourian, in a fiery speech in St. Louis called the desolation of Western Missouri a game between Ewing and Lane for the Senate seat of Kansas.6

Still another factor in the issuance of the order, it appears, was the pressure which Lane had brought to bear on Ewing. Ewing as a politician realized that Lane was the political leader in Kansas and that his own future could be brightened by acceding to Lane’s wishes. When the two men met at Morristown on 22 August 1863, William Mowdry, a Union officer who was present, reported that Lane told Ewing he would have him removed as soon as he could get to Washington. Ewing then begged Lane’s forgiveness, and Lane agreed to save Ewing if he would issue the order. After writing the order, Mowdry allegedly heard Lane say to Ewing, “You are a dead dog if you fail to issue that order as agreed between us.”7

Accepting the fact that the two men, met, an unanswered question remains. Why would Jim Lane, whose home and possessions were destroyed in the “Sack of Lawrence,” a man who screamed for blood and fire, be satisfied by a purely military order of orderly depopulation of a section of Missouri. Historian Richard Brownlee wrote, “Is it possible then, that Jim Lane would ever have accepted the order as a remedy unless there was an additional unwritten provision to it which he demanded and to which Ewing agreed?” Brownlee thought there was a bargain that the order would be “enforced by federalized Kansas troops. …”8 It should be pointed out that it was after the Lane- Ewing meeting that Lane stated that he wished to see the district burned and destroyed and the disloyal people exterminated.

Continued in Part II

General William Tecumseh Sherman is one of the best known Union generals of the Civil War. His famous “March to the Sea” was the death knell for the Confederate States. His services prior to the war were as the superintendent of the Alexandria Military Academy in Louisiana. With the pending secession of Louisiana, Sherman submitted his request to be relieved of command of the academy on the grounds that if “Louisiana withdraw from the Federal Union, I prefer to maintain my allegiance to the Constitution as long as a fragment of it survives; and my longer stay here would be wrong in every sense of the word.”

He then moved his family to Lancaster Ohio and had an occasion to the meet President Abraham Lincoln with his politician brother John Sherman. He came away adamant on staying out of the hostilities that were coming, instead preferring to dedicate himself strictly to his family. He relates in his memoirs that,

I was sadly disappointed, and remember that I broke out on John, damning the politicians generally, saying, “You have got things in a hell of a fig, and you may get them out as you best can,” adding that the country was sleeping on a volcano that might burst forth at any minute, but that I was going to St. Louis to take care of my family, and would have no more to do with it. John begged me to be more patient, but I said I would not; that I had no time to wait, that I was off for St. Louis; and off I went.

Sherman resided in St. Louis on Locust Street between Tenth and Eleventh streets at the time South Carolina seceded in 1861 and was employed by the St Louis Railroad Company. After the bombardment of Ft Sumter, he was offered the position of chief clerkship of the War Department, which he declined, stating that,

Hon. M. Blair, Washington, D. C. I received, about nine o’clock Saturday night, your telegraph dispatch, which I have this moment answered, “I cannot accept.”

I have quite a large family, and when I resigned my place in Louisiana, on account of secession, I had no time to lose; and, therefore, after my hasty visit to Washington, where I saw no chance of employment, I came to St. Louis, have accepted a place in this company, have rented a house, and incurred other obligations, so that I am not at liberty to change.

I thank you for the compliment contained in your offer, and assure you that I wish the Administration all success in its almost impossible task of governing this distracted and anarchical people.

Yours truly, W.T. SHERMAN

The letter, Sherman tells, was told that it gave offense and that the President’s cabinet felt Sherman would “prove false to the country.” Even his friends were a bit skeptical of Sherman’s political position, so Sherman addressed a letter to the War Department, showing his allegiance to the Union, but only to a certain extent:

Office of the St. Louis Railroad Company, May 8,1861.

Hon. S. Cameron, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir: I hold myself now, as always, prepared to serve my country in the capacity for which I was trained. I did not and will not volunteer for three months, because I cannot throw my family on the cold charity of the world. But for the three-years call, made by the President, an officer can prepare his command and do good service.

I will not volunteer as a soldier, because rightfully or wrongfully I feel unwilling to take a mere private’s place, and, having for many years lived in California and Louisiana, the men are not well enough acquainted with me to elect me to my appropriate place.

Should my services be needed, the records of the War Department will enable you to designate the station in which I can render most service.

Yours truly, W. T. SHERMAN.

However, he was present and witnessed the events at Camp Jackson and the discontent the people held for the Union, hurrahing Jeff Davis, and eventually shots being fired. He realized that he could no longer hold back his desire to avoid getting involved. He received a dispatch from Washington telling him he had been appointed Colonel of the Thirteenth Regular Infantry. He had originally believed he would come back to St. Louis to raise his own regiment at Jefferson Barracks, however, he notes in his memoirs that “the Government was trying to rise to a level with the occasion. Mr. Lincoln had, without the sanction of law, authorized the raising of ten new regiments of regulars, each infantry regiment to be composed of three battalions of eight companies each; and had called for seventy-five thousand State volunteers.”

His stay in St. Louis of two months ended. He stated that

…satisfied that I would not be permitted to return to St. Louis, I instructed Mrs. Sherman to pack up, return to Lancaster, and trust to the fate of war. I also resigned my place as president of the Fifth Street Railroad, to take effect at the end of May, so that in fact I received pay from that road for only two months’ service, and then began my new army career.

When the war ended Sherman remained in the military, rising to General in Chief of the Army from 1869 to 1883. During that time, he moved his headquarters back to St. Louis. When he retired from the Army he moved to New York City and died on February 14, 1891 at the age of 71. At his request, Sherman was transported back to St Louis and buried in Calvary Cemetery.

Brigadier General Egbert Benson Brown, military leader in Missouri during the Civil war, was born in Brownville, New York, October 24, 1816. He later moved with his family to Tecumseh, Michigan. In his youth Brown went to Toledo, Ohio, where he was elected mayor when he was 33 years old. Later he went to the West coast, entered service on a whaling ship, and spent 4 years on the Pacific Ocean.

By the beginning of the Civil war, Brown had become superintendent of a railroad and was living in St. Louis. A Unionist, he raised a regiment of infantry in St. Louis. November 29, 1862, Brown was made a brigadier general of the Missouri volunteers, having earlier received command of the southwest division with headquarters at Springfield. Brown had the responsibility of defending Springfield and the southwestern border of the State. Two of the most threatening raids that he repulsed were those of General John S. Marmaduke, General Joseph O. Shelby and others against Springfield, January 8, 1863, and of Shelby at Marshall and Sedalia during October 10-26, 1863.

The combined Union forces in Springfield numbered between 800 and 2000 in January, the latter number including reinforcements that came during the battle. The Confederates had about 5000 men. In spite of his smaller force Brown successfully defended Springfield, losing only one of the 4 forts built in a square for the town’s defense. By night Marmaduke had had enough.

When Brown began his campaign against Shelby later that year, his forces were scattered over a territory 120 miles square. In 7 days he concentrated a force of around 1820 men, marched more than 300 miles, killed and wounded about 400 of the enemy, captured nearly 100 prisoners and a wagon train of small arms and ammunition. He carried on an almost continuous fight through 100 miles of thickly wooded country.

At the October 23, 1864 Battle of Westport, Missouri, while commanding a brigade of cavalry, he ran afoul with division commander Major General Alfred Pleasonton, who had him arrested and relieved of his duties for allegedly failing to obey General Pleasonton’s attack order. he sat without a command until January 1865, when he was appointed commander of the District of Rolla. He served through the end of the war, and left the Army with one shoulder totally disabled and a bullet in his hip in November 1865.

Brown’s life after the war

After the close of the war Brown was appointed pension agent in St. Louis, and in 1869 he retired and moved to a farm near Hastings, Illinois. From 1881 to 1884 he served on the Illinois State board of equalization.

Brown outlived his wife and children and died February 11, 1902 at the age of 87 at his granddaughters home in West Plains, Missouri and is buried next to his wife Mary in Kinder Cemetery in Cuba, Missouri.

During the Civil War, the effective use of artillery was often one the factors that determined victory in battle. The following after action report by Col. Edward Lynde of the Ninth Kansas Volunteer Cavalry gives credit where credit was due to the Yankee Artillery that was instrumental in the Union victory in the Battle of Newtonia, Mo., on Sept. 29, 1862. This report is found on Pages 291-293 in Series I, Vol. 13 of the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion.

“Sarcoxie, Mo., Oct. 1, 1862.

General: In compliance with your verbal orders, I left camp at this place on the morning of the 29th of September 1862, accompanied by Majs. Bancroft and Pomeroy and four companies of this regiment, viz: Co. D, Capt. Coleman; Co. E, Capt. Flesher; Co. F commanded by Lt. Spencer; Co. H, Capt. Killen and two howitzers (small cannon) under the command of Lt. Opdyke of Co. F and proceeded in the direction of Newtonia, feeling my way. At a distance of eight miles from our camp, we commenced driving in the pickets of the enemy.

Arrived on the prairie in front of the town, our farther advance was disputed by a strong picket guard stationed in and around a deserted house and corn field on our left (distance from town about 1 1/4 miles). At this point I discovered a strong outpost still farther on our left and nearly in our rear. I ordered Capt. Coleman, with his company, to observe their movements, while I directed Lt. Opdyke to shell the house and corn field; Maj. Pomeroy, with one company covering (protecting) the howitzers. A few rounds from our howitzers soon dispersed the enemy, who sought shelter in the town. We then advanced our lines to within three-quarters of a mile of the town and opened on them with the howitzers, but the distance was too great for our shells to do any damage.

After remaining on the field for 1 1/2 hours and making what observations I could, the enemy not replying with any guns, I ordered the command to retire. At this time two prisoners were brought in from whom I learned the strength of the enemy in town to be about 2,000 with two pieces of cannon. We fell back slowly to the prairie north of Shoal Creek, rested, retired to camp and reported to you. On the morning of the 30th, I again left my camp at 3 o’clock a.m. with the same command as yesterday, according to your verbal orders and proceeded to Newtonia, arriving there about 6 o’clock a.m. and found Lt. Col. Jacobi of the 9th Wisconsin Volunteers with reinforcements, already on the ground and the action had already commenced by Capt. Medford of the 6th Kansas volunteer Cavalry, driving in the outpost of the enemy on our left in splendid style and aking some prisoners. A portion of the infantry having been ordered forward to a wooded ravine north of the town by Lt. Col. Jacobi, I now ordered the artillery forward under the command of Lt. Masterson, to the center, at the same time directing Majs. Bancroft and Pomeroy, with the 9th Kansas Volunteer Cavalry and the two howitzers to occupy an elevated piece of ground on our extreme right and Capt. Medford was directed to occupy our left.

The artillery opened on the town in gallant style with shot and shell. The position of the enemy proved to be a strong one, they having the shelter of several brick houses, one large stone barn, as well as a long line of heavy stone wall. Near the stone barn the enemy had two pieces of cannon which opened fire on us in answer tour own. This was the position of things at about 7 o’clock a.m.

The enemy having got the range of our guns, they were changed to a new position father down to the right and nearer the town and enemy. Their shots were now thrown at random sometimes on our right, sometimes on our center and then again our left without doing any damage.

The firing from our guns not being as effective as I desired, they were directed to advance still nearer and within about 600 yards of the town.

The artillery now played on the position of the enemy with marked effect, dealing death and destruction at each discharge and for a time their guns were silenced. They soon got them into a new position, but did us no damage.

The Ninth Kansas Volunteer Cavalry, with the howitzers, were now ordered up from our right and Capt. Flesher, with Co. E, was directed to support Capt. Medford on the left — the balance to support the battery, the howitzers occupying a position by the side of the larger guns-the balance of the infantry having been ordered forward to the wooded ravine by Lt. Col. Jacobi I soon after saw the infantry close to the stone wall already described, from which soon leaped a perfect stream of fire right into the ranks of the infantry, they returning the fire nobly and slowly retired. And just here permit me to say the conduct of the infantry under those trying circumstances deserves the highest commendation, showing front against rash odds and resisting the desperate attempts of the enemy to overwhelm them.

Deeming it impossible to take the town by storm with my small force, numbering barely 500 and observing the enemy firing signal rockets from their guns into the air, I ordered the command to retire which was done in good order until we reached the high ground adjoining the timber. Before reaching that point, however, reports were brought to me that large bodies of reinforcements of the enemy were seen arriving from the southwest as well as the west. I now observed the enemy swarming from their concealed position in the town to harass our retreat. One regiment or more, said to be under the command of Col. Cooper, coming up on our rear, another body as large on our right flank through the corn field, the artillery was again brought into position and the ranks of the enemy were mowed down with great slaughter. We continued to retire, forming and reforming, for the infantry to pass the cavalry and reload. The artillery on arriving at the woods having been ordered in the advance, under cover of Company F, Ninth Kansas Volunteer Cavalry, were armed with revolvers and sabers only, while the enemy was armed with long- range guns.

Here Maj. Bancroft, assisted by Maj. Pomeroy of the Ninth Kansas Volunteer Cavalry, as well as the Ninth Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry, made a gallant stand, but were overpowered by numbers and were obliged to retreat.

The officers in general are entitled to praise for their heroic manner in which they conducted themselves and the soldiers are worthy of all praise for the determined manner in which they resisted repeated assaults of the enemy. Our loss I am unable to give, as no reports have been made to me. The loss of the enemy must have been far greater than ours. I estimate their loss at 300 killed and wounded.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

E. LYNDE,

Colonel Commanding.”

Throughout the ages, “artillery” has been described as the “King of Battle” and this report clearly indicates that it was a decisive factor in the Battle of Newtonia.

If, it had not been effectively used as it was, Col. Lynde and his command probably would have been destroyed and the battle would have been lost. However this was not the case, and of course, the war went on!

Sunshine pierced low, billowing clouds as people jammed the rain-washed 12th Street Bridge and Union Depot platforms. A special train eased onto Track 1 at 8:48 a.m. with an officer’s sabre slung from the locomotive headlamp.

A volley by the St. Louis Light Artillery shattered the respectful silence.

Thus began the funeral procession of Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman, Civil War hero and occasional St. Louisan. For four hours on Feb. 21, 1891, a procession of 12,000 soldiers, veterans and notables marched past mourners on a winding, seven-mile path from downtown to Calvary Cemetery.

Young Capt. Sherman and his bride, Ellen, first moved here in 1850, living near Chouteau Avenue and 12th Street (now Tucker Boulevard). They returned briefly in 1861 when he took a job with a streetcar company. Two weeks later, Fort Sumter was bombarded.

Back in blue Union uniform, he soon became Gen. U.S. Grant’s most trusted fellow warrior. Sherman’s capture of Atlanta in 1864 was tonic to the weary North and helped save Abraham Lincoln’s re-election. His march through Georgia proved there was no safe place in Dixie.

William and Ellen Sherman returned to St. Louis at war’s end. Grateful businessmen raised $30,000 to buy and furnish a spacious two-story home for them at 912 North Garrison Avenue, west of downtown. They lived there on and off for 11 of their remaining years.

From the Garrison address flowed a famous telegram. In 1884, Republicans pressed the former general to be their presidential nominee. He wired back: “I will not accept if nominated and will not serve if elected.”

The Sherman’s later moved to New York but kept their home on Garrison. Ellen Sherman, a devout Catholic, died in 1888 and was returned for burial in Calvary Cemetery.

He died three years later at 71 in New York on Feb. 14, 1891. The Pennsylvania Railroad provided its executive train to return the general to his wife’s side.

At Union Depot, just east of today’s Amtrak station, the casket was placed on an artillery caisson pulled by four black horses. Cavalry escorted it north on 12th, followed by once-wiry veterans of Sherman’s own Army of the Tennessee. Other units, including Confederate veterans, joined the solemn clattering over cobblestones.

At Calvary, one of the his children, the Jesuit Rev. Thomas Sherman, recited graveside prayers in Latin and English. An honor guard fired three crisp volleys, followed by a last rumble of artillery from a distant hill.

The Rev. Sherman died in 1933. The Sherman family home eventually became an apartment building and was demolished with barely a whimper of protest in 1974. The Sherman graves are a short drive from the front gate at Calvary.

In the area of south-central Missouri in Phelps, Pulaski and Texas counties, there were so many engagements between bushwackers and Union troops that it was impossible to capture every single event. However, engagements such as the following show that the activity in this area during the war was not only frequent, but intense.

This report is by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph A. Eppstein to his commander, Colonel Albert Sigel of the Thirteenth Missouri Cavalry. The adversary and leader of the rebels in the area was CSA Colonel William O. Coleman.

Another interesting detail of this report is the closeness of the engagement. That is, the simple fact that Eppstein decided to charge bayonets rather than waste ammunition. This personal fighting was fairly typical in this area of Missouri as the militia indeed had to conserve ammunition. It once again shows the brutality of the the events in Missouri during the war.

JULY 6-8, 1862.-Scout from Waynesville to the Big Piney, Mo.

Report of Lieutenant Colonel Joseph A. Eppstein, Thirteenth Missouri Cavalry (Militia).
HDQRS. THIRTEENTH CAVALRY MO. STATE MILITIA,
Waynesville, Mo., July 9, 1862.

COLONEL: In pursuance of Special Orders, Numbers 12, from these headquarters, dated Waynesville, July 6, 1862, I started with 30 men of Companies B and F, under Lieutenants Ellington and Brown, to Wayman’s Mill, on Spring Creek, 12 miles from here, where I was informed that a company of Coleman’s men were encamped, about 20 miles from that place on the Big Piney. I immediately left in that direction, and on my way learned that Coleman had taken possession of Houston the day before and was running north toward the Springfield road, a statement which I disbelieved.

Reports of the whereabouts and strength (from 100 to 400) of the company above mentioned was so contradictory, that I did not know how to operate until I came to Johnston’s Mill, about 30 miles from this place, on the Big Piney, where I succeeded in arresting one of Coleman’s men, who told me that he had left camp an hour previous and was on his way home. His farther, who is also a rebel and belongs to the same gang, lives about 10 miles farther on. I compelled him by threats to go with me as guide to the camp, which I certainly could not have found without his assistance.

I started from Johnston’s Mill at sundown on the 7th instant, and at 8.30 p. m. arrived at another mill, where I ordered my men to dismount, leaving the horses in charge of 10 men as guards. From that lace I marched with the balance of my force (20 men, with officers) about a quarter of a mile up the road, thence through a dry creek, following the same for about 300 yards. Half an hour was lost in trying to ascertain the exact whereabouts of the camp, until I suddenly was hailed to halt. I made no reply to their sentinel, but pushed slowly forward until I found myself obstructed by a deep, stagnant creek, which could not be forded. I ordered my men to follow me around until I came to a shallower place; we crossed.

On climbing up the rock on the other side we found the enemy alarmed and formed in line 12 yards in front of us. I ordered them to surrender, but was greeted by several volleys of musketry. It was only then that my men commenced firing, having previously been instructed by me to save their ammunition, and after a few rounds I ordered them to “Charge bayonets,” which was immediately and gallantly executed. The enemy could not stand the charge, and broke in every direction in their shirt-tails, leaving behind them coats, pants, boots, and hats. Owing to the darkness of the night and the thickness of the brush I could not pursue them, and hearing of the proximity of another force of Coleman’s men, was apprehensive of the safety of my little force, and returned after having reconnoitered the ground. I found 4 dead bodies, 1 wounded man, several horses killed, and a lot of clothing and camp equipage strewn in every direction. Considering the proximity of our firing, I judge that many more rebels were wounded, but succeeded in escaping.

Bradford, the prisoner and guide, tried to escape during our charge, but was run through with a bayonet. He was left wounded on the field, but I ordered a neighbor to his assistance. But one of our men was slightly wounded by a buck-shot, as the volleys of the enemy went over our heads.
I captured 3 prisoners, 10 horses, 8 saddles, and 5 guns. The camp equipage was destroyed, as we had no means to take it along. The names of the prisoners are William Hamilton, George Logan, and James Ormsby, all of Company A, Coleman’s battalion.
One of the prisoners stated that Coleman had left Arkansas with about 600 men, but that he had recruited his force since that time to about 800 to 900 men in the adjoining counties; a statement which I fully believe.

Very respectfully, yours,
JOSEPH A. EPPSTEIN,
Lieutenant Colonel, Thirteenth Cavalry, Missouri State Militia.

During the Civil War and all conflicts before and after this war, almost all shots or a shot to the head were fatal. They were normally inflicted by a “sharpshooter” or, in the modern military, by a “sniper.”

This was usually accomplished at a great distance. Often when the chaos of rough and tumble “hand-to-hand” combat occurred, any type of wound inflicted on an enemy would suffice, and this could include a fatal head shot.

Such was the case and unfortunate demise of a local Vernon County, Mo., confederate guerrilla or, if you prefer “bushwhacker,” by the name of “Brice Mayfield.”

The “Mayfield” sisters of Brice and his brother were all southern partisans and were thorns in the sides of many Yankees from Missouri and Kansas early in the Civil War.

Brice Mayfield and his brother John were killed on Dec. 26, 1862, near Neosho in Newton County, Mo. Wagon boss R.M. Peck described the killing of Brice Mayfield in his column in the Aug. 4, 1904, edition of the National Tribune Newspaper that was published in Washington, D. C., as follows:

“The killing of Brice Mayfield”

One day a company of the 3rd Wisconsin Cavalry, on returning from a foraging trip down in Missouri, came into Fort Scott accompanied by Bill Tuft (Tough), Gen. Blunt’s chief of scouts, who was riding a fine blooded flea-bitten gray mare, that had formerly been owned and ridden by Brice Mayfield, a notorious rebel bushwhacker, who had been killed on this trip, in a desperate rough and tumble fight by a German soldier of the 3rd Wis. Cav.

Tuft had bought the mare for a trifle from the soldier, who did not realize her value and, with that immaculate gall for which he (Tough) was famous, took great pride in riding her about the streets of Fort Scott, giving out — and even having an item published in the “Fort Scott Monitor” that he acquired the fine mare by killing Brice Mayfield!

(Note: Captain Tough was recognized throughout eastern Kansas as a very successful “horse trader” before, during and after the Civil War, so it is not surprising that he acquired Mayfield’s fine blooded gray mare.)

The facts concerning the killing of Mayfield, which I heard from one of the soldiers, as near as I can remember them, are about as follows:

The Company of the 3rd Wis. Cav., while on a foraging expedition, had camped near Neosho, Mo., and a German trooper accompanied by a comrade, started out on their own account.

They had ridden up to a farmhouse, hitched their horses to the fence and gone inside to try and buy some butter.

The women of the house being rebels, detained and delayed the soldiers by pretending to send a little girl after the desired butter to a neighbor’s house near by, where they knew that Mayfield and another rebel were in hiding; but in reality the errand of the little girl was to inform the bushwhackers of the presence at the other house of the two soldiers.

While our two troopers were sitting in the house waiting for the girls return and the women by pleasant conversation were trying to make their visit agreeable, the German chanced to step to the window in front of the house and was astonished to notice two more horses hitched to the fence near his and his comrade’s and at the same moment he saw two men in butternut clothes (a sure sign of a rebel) approaching the door.

Instantly comprehending the situation, the German soldier, who was a powerful big fellow, informed his comrade and drawing their revolvers they both sprang to the door, opened it quickly and fired at the same instant receiving fire from the rebels.

At the first shots the German’s comrade fell dead and Mayfield’s companion was also killed.

As Mayfield made a rush to come in, the German quickly stepped behind the door, both firing at the same time, the soldier hitting the rebel, but not wounding him seriously, while Mayfield’s ball (shot) struck the door and glanced off.

The bushwhacker was also a strong, active man, and as he sprang into the house they grappled, each trying to wrench the other’s pistol from him.

In the struggle, they fell to the floor, where, after several moments of desperate strife, the Dutchman (another word for the “German” soldier) succeeded in disengaging his pistol, placed the muzzle to the rebel’s head and fired, killing him (with a fatal head shot)!

The women and children had fled out of the back door at the first shot, and on disengaging himself from the dead rebel and rising, the plucky “Dutchman” found he was the sole surviving tenant of the house.

Fearing that the women had gone to bring other rebels to take him in, he hastily examined his late comrade and, finding him dead and making sure that the two rebels were “safely converted” (were indeed dead), he stripped each of his belt and pistol, hung them on their respective saddles and rode off to camp, leading three riderless horses.

A detachment of soldiers was immediately sent out from our men’s camp to bring in and bury the body of the brave German’s comrade, and while they were at the house — the women and children being still absent — a spark of fire somehow got started in some combustible material, and the house and outbuildings with all their contents, were soon a heap of ashes!

(Now, of course, this is not surprising because both bushwhackers and Yankees burned their enemy’s civilian houses as it was total war here in Missouri and eastern Kansas.)

Tuft (Capt. William Tough) was in the soldiers’ camp when the German returned with his captured stock, and being a good judge of a horse, he saw that the flea-bitten gray mare was an extraordinarily fine animal and succeeded in buying her from the soldier before the man found out her good points.

And that is how Bill Tuft killed Brice Mayfield and captured his fine thoroughbred.

I (R.M. Peck) afterwards passed by the ruins of the house where Mayfield was killed, which was near the bank of Shoal Creek, a little way north of the town of Neosho, Mo.”

Now then, it is rare when one finds two descriptions of the same event from slightly different perspectives, and next week’s column will include another description of the killing of Brice Mayfield and, of course, the war went on!

This is the conclusion of part 1 & 2 and provides reports given by Major General Samuel Curtis’ subordinates Col. W.F. Cloud, Major Weed and Major S.S. Curtis during the events at Mine Creek. It gives accounts of Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Benteen’s brigade, who would later gain fame with George A. Custer at the Battle of Little Big Horn.

Colonel W. F. Cloud’s Report

Colonel W. F. Cloud, acting on my staff, with a small detachment of his own regiment (Second Kansas), reports these battles as follows:

Accompanied by a small detachment of Kansas Cavalry (the Second), commanded by Sergeant Peck, I moved forward in the space between our extreme right and the left, giving such orders and encouragement to our forces as seemed necessary. In this order we came to a rebel battery, the men of which had ceased to fight from fear, at which a rebel colonel (Jeffers) surrendered to me, claiming protection for himself and men. Giving such directions as seemed proper for guarding the prisoners, I moved to another part of the field, assisting in arresting prisoners and securing several pieces of artillery abandoned by the rebels in their retreat through the brush and creek.

Seeing General Pleasanton upon the field near to a section of artillery, I moved forward and reported facts as directed, and then observing that he was directing the fire of our artillery upon a detachment of our own troops I so informed him, but was rebuked. Still persisting in my statements, I had them confirmed by an officer from the detachment under fire, whose assurances were united with my own and prevailed upon the general to give the order to cease firing, saying at the same time, “You should carry your colors upon the battle-field.”

At the order of General Sanborn the Second Kansas Cavalry was moved forward as skirmishers, come mounted, some dismounted, and drove the enemy out of the woods and across the river. Here the enemy had another line formed, and our troops were ordered forward, the Second Kansas remaining in its position on the right, and in this order, pressing forward, we reached from right to left in the form of a crescent, which placed us in the advance of the center. When the rebels retreated from our steadily advancing army, my command had the advance from the advantageous formation of the ground, and leading in this manner pursued the enemy for the distance of three miles in a continuous charge until compelled to halt from sheer exhaustion of the horses, many of them falling under their riders.

Colonel Cloud was very active during the campaign, and his immediate connection with the capture of Colonel Jeffers and the battery of rebel guns at Mine Creek and leading the skirmishers at the Osage, are distinguished achievements which ought to secure his promotion.

Major Weed’s Report and LTC Benteen

Major Weed, of my staff, additional aide-de-camp and commissary of musters of my department, also participated in this day’s fight, and reports his detached services as follows:

I remained with the major-general commanding until Philips’ brigade had crossed the stream at Trading Post, when I was ordered over with a message to General Pleasanton, and after delivering it proceeded to the front with Colonel Blair and Major R. H. Hunt. Three miles south of Trading Post, with Mine Creek in their rear, we found the entire fighting force of the enemy (Shelby’s division excepted) drawn up in line of battle. As only one brigade of our own troops had come up, I rode a short distance back on a road running parallel with and to the left of the one on which Philips’ brigade had marched, and very soon met Lieutenant-Colonel Benteen at the head of his brigade, and informed him of the position of the enemy. He pushed rapidly forward, and on coming in sight of the rebel line at once formed his brigade for a charge. I then started to return to the troops already on the field, to urge upon the commanding officer a charge at the same moment with that of Benteen.

Before reaching the command, however, I was accosted by an officer who pointed to the right center regiment of Philips’ brigade, and asked me to take that regiment into action, and to tell the men their colonel would soon be with them. He then rode off at a rapid pace in a northwesterly direction, probably on some urgent mission. I at once rode to the head of the regiment indicated, gave the message to all the officers, and to lessen as much as possible the depressing effect of the commanding officer’s absence upon the men, charged with and in advance of them. As they came near enough to the enemy’s line to open fire I crossed their front and took position in the line on the right, where, in conjunction with Major R. H. Hunt, I did what I could to encourage and urge it forward. After the enemy’s line had been broken and his whole force put to flight, I rode to the left of our line and assisted in gathering together and sending to the rear a large number of prisoners who had been captured with the artillery taken by Benteen’s brigade. While engaged in this duty I heard of the capture of General Marmaduke, and some twenty minutes later, meeting General Pleasanton, who was just coming to the field, I informed him of the fact, also telling him that Marmaduke had already been sent to the rear. I then, at his request, took several squads of our men who had been separated from their commands during the charge and proceeded to pick up prisoners, who were scattered over every part of the battle-ground, some under guard and many making their way to the rear without guards and no guides except their own fears.

After having performed this duty, I reported to the commanding general (who had already crossed Mine Creek) and was directed to proceed to the rear and urge forward the division of Major-General Blunt and the brigade of General McNeil with all possible speed. These troops had been delayed by the breaking down of some transportation wagons at the most difficult point of crossing, and some time elapsed before the road could be opened. I returned to the front with General McNeil and Major Charlot, and on arriving there reported to and remained with the commanding general until nearly sundown.

Major S. S. Curtis’ Report

Major S. S. Curtis, Second Colorado, and an aide-de-camp on staff, after the close of the fight at the Marais des Cygnes, went forward with General Pleasanton, and reports as follows concerning matters at the battle of Osage:

I overtook General Pleasanton and rode with him for some distance. When about three miles from Marais des Cygnes we commenced to hear firing at the front, and General Pleasanton sent orders back for McNeil and Sanborn to hurry forward with all practicable dispatch, while we pushed forward at a trot and canter. When we first heard the firing Benteen’s brigade was on a parallel road to the one we were on and to our right. He immediately put his command on the gallop and well fell to the rear of his column, as the roads soon came together.

Benteen’s brigade broke into regimental columns as they approached the battle-field, and as they came up on the left of Philips’ brigade went forward into line and right on into the charge. The enemy was cannonading Philips’ brigade when we came into sight, but the musketry firing had nearly ceased. General Pleasanton requested me to take his escort company and support a section of a battery which just then came up. General Pleasanton went forward, and I directed the lieutenant to post his guns on a small elevation and shell the enemy’s right where the artillery was posted. But two shots were fired when I heard the yells raised by Benteen’s brigade and saw the enemy’s line breaking. I immediately ordered the guns forward to a better position, and had just got them in position when General Sanborn rode up and directed the lieutenant to fire upon some troops on the south side of Mine Creek, and on our extreme left. I felt doubtful as to whether they were rebels or our own troops, but a second thought made me conclude they were rebels. Four shots were fired at them when I saw by their falling back to our lines that they must be our own men. I rode forward to the guns to stop their firing, when Generals Sanborn and Pleasanton both rode up and ordered them to cease.

At this time the enemy’s cannonading on our right had not yet ceased. The enemy by this time being in full retreat, with the exception of their extreme left, which could scarcely be reached with artillery from where we were without danger to our command, and directly in front of us, our troops were immediately on the heels of the retreating rebels. I told the lieutenant in charge of two guns to follow as fast as he could, while I, with the escort company, pushed forward to rejoin General Pleasanton. A short distance before reaching the creek I found Major Weed, who told me of the capture of General Marmaduke. I pushed on and told General Pleasanton, and just as I did so General Cabell was brought up a prisoner. At this time we could see a second rebel line forming on top of the hill ahead of us, and our troops being scattered in pursuit General Pleasanton sent orders for them to halt and reform. I assisted in reforming the line and sending prisoners to the rear until General Pleasanton again ordered an advance, when I advanced with him. I waited on the hill until General Curtis came up and rode with him to the banks of the next stream, when I rode up to the summit of the hill to the right of the road to obtain, if possible, a view of the charge being made by McNeill’s brigade, which had taken the advance through the timber on Little Osage.

General Pleasanton, as commander of the advance division, acted with great coolness and propriety throughout this battle of the Osage, and if our battery fired on a portion of Colonel Benteen’s troops after they crossed the creek my son, Major Curtis, clearly exonerates General Pleasanton from directing the matter, which was one of those incidents of battle which often occur. Colonel Benteen and his brigade evidently took the lead in the movement which captured the prisoners and guns at Mine Creek and deserves the greatest applause for personal gallantry.

Brigadier-General McNeil concluded the matter on the height beyond the Osage with great success and courage. Nearly all these troops being of General Pleasanton’s division and under his general supervision, he also deserves the gratitude of the country. General Blunt’s division, crowding forward and augmenting the power and force which overcame the enemy, is equally deserving of the honor of the day. We were everywhere successful, and the following officers of my staff, although some of them have been already named, deserve special commendation for their unceasing toil and extraordinary gallantry at this battle of the Osage: Honorable J. H. Lane, Colonel C. W. Blair, Colonel W. F. Cloud, Colonel S. J. Crawford, Major T. I. McKenny, Major C. S. Charlot, Major R. H. Hunt, and Major S. S. Curtis. Captain Hinton, and others of General Blunt’s staff, also took an active part. The reports of Major McKenny and Major Hunt are especially interesting, but the extracts here made seem to cover the entire field and facts, and I refer to theirs and others here submitted as well deserving of general perpetuity.